1 184. Finally, Seligman requested to be sent back to the Training Division. 2 Doyle granted this request, but refused to give Seligman a supervisory position, despite the fact that Seligman's supervisors had rated him "Outstanding" in his 3 4 previous, supervisory assignment in the Psychiatric Section. 5 6 Seligman's 2009 Punitive Transfer 7 8 9 185. In 2009 Seligman joined ADDA's Contract Negotiating Team. 10 186. In a bargaining session on March 17, 2009, Seligman questioned 11 12 Defendants' punitive transfers of prosecutors. In response, a member of Cooley's bargaining team told Seligman that she found his comments to be "off-putting." 13 14 Seligman told her that he apologized if she found his comments to be offensive. 15 16 187. Two days later, Seligman's supervisor in the Training Division informed him that Defendants were transferring Seligman to the DA's branch office in Long 17 Beach. Seligman's supervisor was upset by the transfer and did not want to lose 18 19 Seligman as a trainer for new deputy prosecutors, given that he had performed key components of every training class for the past thirteen years. In fact, Seligman was 20 21 informed that he was not to have any role whatsoever in training any of the new 22 prosecutors. 23 188. Defendants' punitive transfers of Seligman and Dver¹³ from the Training 24 25 Division have ensured that no ADDA Board members are available to train newly 26 27 ¹³ See, *supra*, ¶ 37.

hired prosecutors and that new prosecutors, in turn, will not have any pro-union mentors during the early years of their careers in the DA's office.

- 189. Seligman promptly contacted Michael Tranbarger, the Head Deputy of the Long Beach Branch Office and the person who would soon be Seligman's superior. Tranbarger informed Seligman that Long Beach did not need Seligman and did not have any office space for him. He then said that he would find somewhere to
- 190. Seligman's assignments in Long Beach do not include any training of deputy prosecutors or special expertise in psychiatric issues.

put a desk for Seligman, even if it was in a hallway.

- 191. Defendants subjected Seligman to these punitive transfers in accordance with their Union Discrimination Policy, and in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment Rights of Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Association.
- 192. Four months after Defendants transferred him to Long Beach, Seligman received a PE rating of "Meets Expectations" from Tranbarger. This rating was two tiers below the "Outstanding" ratings Seligman had previously received throughout his career. The PE did not describe any of Seligman's work during his prior eight months at the Training Division, despite the fact that PEs are supposed to be based upon a prosecutor's performance for an entire 12-month period.
- 193. When Seligman asked Tranbarger about the PE, Tranbarger explained that a "Meets Expectations" rating was the highest rating he was allowed to give to Seligman and, if he had given Seligman a higher rating in his PE, Defendants would have "kicked it back" to Tranbarger and made him revise it.

1 2 DDA James Bozajian's Background 3 4 James Bozajian is a Grade III deputy district attorney. He joined the DA's office in 1990 and has been on ADDA's Board of Directors since 1993. He 5 6 served as ADDA's President in 1996 and 1997. 7 8 195. Bozajian has also served as a member of the Calabasas City Council for 9 13 years. 10 11 As with his fellow ADDA colleagues, Bozajian has routinely received 12 "Outstanding" ratings on his PEs. His 2007 PE contained the following remarks: 13 14 Mr. Bozajian did an excellent job in the arraignment court in San 15 Fernando. He took the job very seriously and represented our office 16 well in court. He overhauled the filing system for [drug court] and 17 bench warrant files so that the files are more readily accessible. He read files carefully in preparation for arraignments, making sure that the 18 19 charges filed and the bail requested were appropriate. Mr. Bozajian 20 would bring to my attention issues that he spotted which may have 21 eluded the filing deputies. Mr. Bozajian also displayed initiative in 22 taking upon himself the preparation on a monthly basis of statistics on 23 [drug court] and [deferred entry of judgment] cases. Mr. Bozajian has been very dependable in his attendance and 24 observance of work hours. Despite the fact that the arraignment court 25 26 was not an easy assignment as it often ran late into the evening, Mr.

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1 Bozajian approached the assignment without any complaints. He 2 required minimal instruction, yet sought guidance when appropriate. 3 4 Mr. Bozajian got along well with his colleagues, office staff and courtroom staff. Mr. Bozajian did an outstanding job in San Fernando. 5 6 7 197. As a result of Bozajian's participation and support of ADDA, Defendants 8 have transferred him eight times in the past eight years. 9 10 198. These transfers included three years in the Juvenile Courts in Sylmar and Antelope Valley between 2001 and 2004, an unprecedented punishment for a 11 12 prosecutor with over a decade of experience, as Bozajian had at that time. 13 14 199. After Bozajian and other ADDA Board members began seeking 15 certification of ADDA as an employee organization, Defendants used DA 16 Investigators to harass him. 17 18 200. In January 2006, Defendants instructed two DA Investigators to hand 19 deliver a letter to Bozajian. This letter threatened disciplinary action if he sent 20 political material from his home computer to other deputy district attorneys. 21 22 201. When the DA Investigators served this letter upon Bozajian, they were 23 apologetic and expressed their regrets to him. 24 25 This harassment came in the midst of one of the most hotly contested 202. elections in ADDA's history. Defendants had tacitly supported a rival slate of 26 27 28

1 candidates who opposed unionization. Defendants used DA Investigators to disrupt 2 the re-election efforts of ADDA Board Members such as Bozajian. 3 4 Steve Ipsen, ADDA's President, was also personally served with a letter 5 by DA Investigators threatening discipline against him. 6 7 204. Both before and after January 2006, Defendants routinely permitted non-8 ADDA members to use office e-mail addresses to send and receive political material. 9 They have also permitted ADDA members deemed to be pro-Cooley to use office email addresses for the same purpose. 10 11 12 205. On or about May 26, 2008, Bozajian mailed a letter to all of his fellow 13 deputies in the DA's Office. The letter was entitled "10 Reasons Why Steve Cooley 14 Does Not Deserve Another Term in Office." Bozajian sent the letter to each deputy's 15 office via U.S. Mail and bore all of the related mailing and copying expenses. 16 17 206. Defendants Cooley and Spillane illegally ordered the impoundment and destruction of this mail. 18 19 20 207. On October 19, 2009, Defendants suspended Bozajian without pay for 30 days. Plaintiffs are informed, believe, and thereon allege that Bozajian's suspension 21 22 resulted from Defendants' anti-union animus. 23 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS** 24 25 26 208. ADDA brings its Class Action claims on behalf of itself and all other 27 persons similarly situated pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. Rules 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3). 28

- 209. Pursuant to Cent. Dist. Local Rule 23-2.2, ADDA alleges the following:
- (a) The Class consists of Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorneys in Grades I through IV from December 2007 through February 2008 who returned union cards during that time demonstrating their desire to become unionized employees.
- (b) The Class consists of approximately 650 prosecutors, thus the members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable.
- (c) ADDA will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class who, by definition, are favorably disposed toward the union. ADDA has retained competent and experienced counsel for this matter. ADDA has no interests that are adverse or antagonistic to those of the other members of the Class.
- (d) Questions of fact common to the Class are present in that the invasion of the Class members' privacy rights arose from the same acts: (1) Defendant Burke's disclosure to Cooley and his management officials of a highly confidential list containing the names of prosecutors who returned union cards and (2) Defendants' use of that list to threaten adverse employment actions against those that voted for unionization as well as slandering all prosecutors who returned union cards. Questions of law common to the Class are also present because all of the Class members' rights arise from the same

provisions of the U.S. Constitution and the same procedural rules will apply to 1 all of the Class members. 2 3 ADDA's claims are typical of those of the Class members. (e) 4 Defendants' disclosure and exploitation of highly sensitive information 5 identifying prosecutors who returned union cards has resulted in union activities 6 by members being chilled, thereby damaging both union members and the 7 union as an entity. 8 9 The claims arising from Defendants' violation of the Class 10 (f) members' privacy rights are suitable for certification under F.R.Civ.P. Rule 11 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate and a class 12 action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 13 14 adjudication of this controversy, for several reasons: 15 1) The members of the Class have little interest in individually 16 controlling the prosecution of separate actions. Virtually all of 17 them are career prosecutors currently employed by Defendants, 18 and desire to remain so employed for the duration of their careers 19 and do not desire to further antagonize Defendants by bringing 20 separate suits; 21 22 2) There is no pending litigation concerning the violations suffered 23 by members of the Class; 24 25 26 27 28

- 3) Concentrating the litigation of the Class members' claims is desirable because all of them will be subject to the same procedural rules and substantive law;
- 4) The Class will be manageable because it is precisely defined, easily ascertained, and its virtually all of its members are currently employed by the District Attorney's Office. No hostility or antagonism exists among Class members.
- (g) ADDA proposes to notify members of the proposed Class by first class mail and/or by notices that can be easily placed in paycheck envelopes or included with other notices that Defendants regularly distribute to prosecutors. ADDA also notes that notice would be both feasible and economical through the use of Defendants' internal email system, which is connected to the computer terminals assigned to each of the Class members.
- 210. The claims arising from Defendants' violation of the Class members' privacy rights are also suitable for certification under F.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendants have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of U.S. Constitution, Amendment I – Freedom of Association)
(On Behalf of Plaintiffs ADDA and the Unnamed Deputy District Attorney
Against All Defendants)

211. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all of the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein.

212. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that Plaintiffs ADDA and the Unnamed Deputy District Attorney had a right to freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This right encompasses the right of all workers, both in public and private sectors, to form, and participate in, labor unions.

213. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that Plaintiffs ADDA and the Unnamed Deputy District Attorney had a right to be free from actions taken by a governmental employer that "chill the exercise of First Amendment Freedoms."

214. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that the First Amendment right to freedom of association is violated by threats of retaliation against persons desiring to exercise that right as well as actual retaliation occurring after the fact.

215. At all times pertinent hereto, each Defendant knew, or should have known, of the aforementioned constitutional rights clearly established under federal law.

216. ADDA desires to have its members be able to gather together and promote the activities of ADDA including, but not limited to, organizing deputy district attorneys, representing deputy district attorneys in negotiations with the County regarding collective bargaining agreements, and advancing legislative

proposals in the California Legislature and the County Board of Supervisors that are 1 beneficial to ADDA members, the public, and the criminal justice system. 2 3 217. Defendants' Union Discrimination Policy has hindered ADDA and its 4 members from organizing and recruiting other deputy district attorneys to become 5 members of ADDA and promote the activities of ADDA. 6 7 218. Defendants' Union Discrimination Policy has also violated the rights of 8 the Unnamed DDA and other deputy district attorneys who desire to become active members of ADDA but do not want to risk exposure to Defendants' Union 10 Discrimination Policy. 11 12 219. Accordingly, Defendants' Union Discrimination Policy violates the right 13 of free association guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States 14 Constitution, made applicable to state and local governments through the Due Process 15 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. 16 17 220. Plaintiffs ADDA and the Unnamed Deputy District Attorney suffered 18 injuries, damages and losses as a result of Defendants' conduct as stated herein. 19 20 21 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 22 (Violation of U.S. Constitution, Amendment I - Freedom of Speech) 23 (On Behalf of All Plaintiffs ADDA and The Unnamed Deputy District Attorney 24 **Against All Defendants)** 25 26 221. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all of the foregoing allegations 27 as though set forth fully herein. 28

222. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that Plaintiffs ADDA and the Unnamed Deputy District Attorney had a right to freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This right encompasses the right of all workers, both in public and private sectors, to discuss, make statements regarding, and express opinions regarding matters of public policy, including "issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to make informed decisions about the operation of their government."

223. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that Plaintiffs ADDA and the Unnamed Deputy District Attorney had a right to be free from government retaliation taken against them for speech that touches matters of public concern. This right to be free of retaliation includes the right to be free from adverse employment action substantially motivated by protected speech.

224. At all times pertinent hereto, each Defendant knew, or should have known, of the aforementioned constitutional rights clearly established under federal law.

225. ADDA and its members have a constitutional right to free speech in relation to the promotion of the activities of ADDA including, but not limited to, public policy matters relating to organizing deputy district attorneys, representing deputy district attorneys in negotiations with the County regarding collective bargaining agreements, and advancing legislative proposals in the California Legislature and the County Board of Supervisors that are beneficial to ADDA members and the criminal justice system.

1 2 226. Defendants' Union Discrimination Policy has hindered ADDA and its 3 members from speaking out about these matters. 4 227. Defendants' Union Discrimination Policy has also violated the free 5 6 speech rights of the Unnamed DDA and other district attorneys who desire to become active members of ADDA and speak out about public policy matters concerning 7 8 ADDA but do not want to risk exposure to Defendants' Union Discrimination Policy. 9 228. Accordingly, Defendants' Union Discrimination Policy violates the right 10 11 of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, 12 made applicable to state and local governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. 13 14 229. Plaintiffs ADDA and the Unnamed Deputy District Attorney suffered 15 16 injuries, damages and losses as a result of Defendants' conduct as stated herein. 17 18 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 19 (Violation of U.S. Constitution, Amendment I – Freedom of Association) 20 21 (On Behalf of Plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt and Seligman Against All Defendants) 22 230. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all of the foregoing allegations 23 set forth in paragraphs 1 through 6, 8 through 207, 211 through 229 as if set forth fully 24 25 herein. 26 231. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that 27 28

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- 232. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that Plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt and Seligman had a right to be free from actions taken by a governmental employer that "chill the exercise of First Amendment Freedoms.
- 233. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that the First Amendment right to freedom of association is violated by threats of retaliation against persons desiring to exercise that right as well as actual retaliation occurring after the fact.
- 234. At all times pertinent hereto, each Defendant knew, or should have known, of the aforementioned constitutional rights clearly established under federal law.
- 235. Plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt and Seligman, who are members of ADDA, and sit on its Board of Directors and negotiating committee, and have done so for several years, desire to be able to gather together, and with other members of ADDA and promote the activities of ADDA including, but not limited to, organizing deputy district attorneys, representing deputy district attorneys in negotiations with the County regarding collective bargaining agreements, and advancing legislative proposals in the California Legislature and the County Board of Supervisors that are beneficial to ADDA members and the criminal justice system.

- 236. Defendants' Union Discrimination Policy, and defendants themselves, including Defendant Cooley, have hindered and prevented plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt and Seligman from organizing and recruiting other deputy district attorneys to become members of ADDA, gathering together to represent the interests of ADDA and of its members, participate in collective bargaining sessions and otherwise conduct the business, further the interests and promote the activities of ADDA and its members.
- 237. Defendants' Union Discrimination Policy and Defendants themselves including Defendant Cooley have also defamed and disparaged plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt and Seligman, in their efforts to further their Union Discrimination Policy and to interfere with these plaintiffs' constitutional rights to associate, by calling ADDA president Ipsen a "crook," a "whore," subjecting Ipsen, Debbaudt and Seligman to punitive transfers, transfers designed to interfere with the collective bargaining process and other union functions and duties, constituting "freeway therapy," lowered evaluations and other adverse employment actions, in order to publicly "make an example" of these plaintiffs in order to dissuade and discourage other DDA's from becoming members of ADDA and associating with these plaintiffs.
- 238. Accordingly, Defendants' Union Discrimination Policy, and the actions of defendants including Defendant Cooley violate the right of free association of plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt and Seligman guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to state and local governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
- 239. As a legal and proximate result of the above-described conduct of said defendants, plaintiffs have sustained and will continue to sustain severe physical,

mental, and emotional injuries, pain, distress, suffering, anguish, fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shame, mortification, injured feelings, shock, humiliation and indignity, as well as other unpleasant physical, mental, and emotional reactions, damages to reputation, and other non-economic damages;

240. As a further legal and proximate result of the above-described conduct of said defendant, plaintiffs were required, and/or in the future may be required, to engage the services of health care providers, and incurred expenses for medicines, health care appliances, modalities, and/or other related expenses in a sum to be ascertained according to proof.

241. As a further legal and proximate result of the above-described conduct of said defendants, plaintiff were and will be hindered, prevented, and/or precluded from performing plaintiffs' usual activities, work, education, and occupations, causing the plaintiffs to sustain damages for loss of income, wages, benefits, earnings, and earning capacity, and other economic damages, in an amount to be ascertained according to proof.

242. As a further legal and proximate result of the above-described conduct of said defendants, plaintiffs suffered incidental, consequential, and/or special damages, in an amount according to proof.

243. As a further legal and proximate result of the above-described conduct of said defendants, plaintiffs have and will sustain attorneys' fees and costs in an amount according to proof.

244. Plaintiffs further request pre-judgment interest as available by law.

245. The aforesaid acts directed towards plaintiffs were carried out with a conscious disregard of plaintiffs' rights and with the intent to vex, injure, and annoy plaintiffs, such as to constitute oppression, fraud or malice, entitling plaintiff to exemplary and/or punitive damages in a sum which is an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of the individual defendants, and each of them, to deter such conduct in the future, and to set an example for others.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of U.S. Constitution, Amendment I – Freedom of Speech)

(On Behalf Plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt and Seligman Against All Defendants)

246. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 6, 8 through 207, 211 through 240 herein as though set forth fully herein.

247. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that Plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt and Seligman had a right to freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This right encompasses the right of all workers, both in public and private sectors, to discuss, make statements regarding, and express opinions regarding matters of public policy, including "issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to make informed decisions about the operation of their government."

248. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that

- 256. As a further legal and proximate result of the above-described conduct of said defendants, plaintiff were and will be hindered, prevented, and/or precluded from performing plaintiffs' usual activities, work, education, and occupations, causing the plaintiffs to sustain damages for loss of income, wages, benefits, earnings, and earning capacity, and other economic damages, in an amount to be ascertained according to proof.
- 257. As a further legal and proximate result of the above-described conduct of said defendants, plaintiffs suffered incidental, consequential, and/or special damages, in an amount according to proof.
- 258. As a further legal and proximate result of the above-described conduct of said defendants, plaintiffs have and will sustain attorneys' fees and costs in an amount according to proof.
 - 259. Plaintiffs further request pre-judgment interest as available by law.
- 260. The aforesaid acts directed towards plaintiffs were carried out with a conscious disregard of plaintiffs' rights and with the intent to vex, injure, and annoy plaintiffs, such as to constitute oppression, fraud or malice, entitling plaintiff to exemplary and/or punitive damages in a sum which is an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of the individual defendants, and each of them, to deter such conduct in the future, and to set an example for others.
- 261. As a further legal and proximate result of the actions of defendants, and each of them, plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt and Seligman have sustained economic damages consisting of loss of past and future earnings, past and future earning

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capacity, promotions, promotional opportunities, benefits, and other career advancement opportunities, in such nature and sums as shall be determined. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Violation of U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV – Equal Protection) (On Behalf of All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants) 262. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all of the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to treat similarly-situated persons equally. 264. Defendants' enforcement of their Union Discrimination Policy, and the actions of defendants, including Defendant Cooley which violate defendants Ipsen, Debbaudt and Seligman's First amendment Rights of Freedom of Association and Freedom of Speech, discriminates against these defendants, and ADDA members while allowing similarly-situated County employees to enjoy their constitutional rights without interference. 265. By treating Ipsen, Debbaudt, Seligman and ADDA members in a discriminatory manner, Defendants have violated these Plaintiffs' fundamental constitutional rights. 266. Defendants have no rational justification for their discrimination or actions which violate First Amendment Rights of plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt, Seligman and ADDA and its members.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 1 (Violation of U.S. Constitution, Amendments IV and XIV) 2 3 (On Behalf of All Members of the Class Consisting of Deputy District Attorneys 4 in Grades I through IV) 5 276. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all of the foregoing allegations 6 7 as if set forth fully herein. 8 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as 9 incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the 10 government to refrain from searches when the target of a search has a reasonable 11 expectation of privacy in the information sought. 12 13 278. The Class of Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorneys in Grades I 14 through IV who signed union cards between December 2007 and February 2008 had a 15 reasonable expectation of privacy under clearly established federal law that applied to 16 17 the act of returning union cards. 18 279. Defendants violated the rights of the Class members by disclosing their 19 identities to management officials, including Defendant Steve Cooley, which has 20 resulted in Defendants using that information to threaten adverse employment actions 21 against Class members as well as Defendants slandering Class members and 22 intimidating them from exercising their constitutional right to unionize. 23 24 The members of the Class have sustained injuries, damages and losses as 25 a result of Defendants' illegal search of documents identifying them as supporters of 26 27 the union.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 1 (Violation of U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV) 2 (On Behalf of All Members of the Class Consisting of Deputy District Attorneys 3 in Grades I through IV) 4 5 281. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all of the foregoing allegations 6 7 as if set forth fully herein. 8 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the 9 interests of individuals in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. 10 11 The Class of Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorneys in Grades I 12 through IV who signed union cards between December 2007 and February 2008 had a 13 privacy interest protected by clearly established federal law regarding their act of 14 returning union cards. 15 16 284. Defendants violated the rights of the Class members by disclosing their 17 identities to management officials, including Defendant Steve Cooley, which has 18 resulted in Defendants using that information to threaten adverse employment actions 19 against Class members as well as Defendants slandering Class members and 20 intimidating them from exercising their constitutional right to unionize. 21 22 285. The members of the Class have sustained injuries, damages and losses as 23 a result of Defendants' illegal disclosure of them as union supporters. 24 25 26 27 28

1 NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 2 (Violation of U.S. Constitution, Amendment I) 3 (On Behalf of All Members of the Class Consisting of Deputy District Attorneys 4 in Grades I through IV) 5 6 286. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all of the foregoing allegations 7 as if set forth fully herein. 8 287. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that 9 the Class of Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorneys in Grades I through IV 10 who signed union cards between December 2007 and February 2008 had a right to 11 freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the 12 United States. This right encompasses the right of all workers, both in public and 13 private sectors, to form, and participate in, labor unions. 14 15 288. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that 16 these plaintiffs had a right to be free from actions taken by a governmental employer 17 that chill the exercise of First Amendment Freedoms. 18 19 289. At all times pertinent hereto, it was clearly established federal law that 20 the First Amendment right to freedom of association is violated by the disclosure to 21 management of one's association with, or support for, a union, threats of retaliation 22 against persons desiring to exercise that right, and actual retaliation occurring after the 23 fact. 24 25 290. At all times pertinent hereto, each Defendant knew, or should have 26 known, of the aforementioned constitutional rights clearly established under federal 27 law. 28

1 2 291. Defendants violated the rights of the Class members by disclosing their identities to management officials, including Defendant Steve Cooley, which has 3 resulted in Defendants using that information to threaten adverse employment actions 4 5 against Class members as well as Defendants slandering Class members and intimidating them from exercising their constitutional right to unionize. 6 7 The members of the Class have sustained injuries, damages and losses as 8 a result of Defendants' violation of their First Amendment Right to Freedom of 9 Association. 10 11 12 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants and that 13 the Court: 14 15 A. Adjudge, decree and declare the rights and other legal relations of the 16 parties to the subject matter and claims in controversy in order that such declarations 17 shall have the force and effect of a final judgment and that the Court retain jurisdiction 18 of this matter for the purpose of enforcing the Court's Orders; 19 20 B. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2201, declare that the Defendants' policies and 21 practices, as alleged above, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 22 United States Constitution; 23 24 C. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2202, F.R.C.P. Rule 65, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 25 preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Defendants from enforcing their 26 unconstitutional policies and practices against Plaintiffs and others similarly situated; 27

1 D. Award Plaintiff ADDA and the Class of Los Angeles County Deputy District 2 Attorneys in Grades I through IV who signed union cards between December 2007 3 and February 2008 compensatory and punitive damages for the injuries suffered in 4 violation of federal law in an amount to be determined by a jury; 5 6 E. Award plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt, and Seligman exemplary and/or punitive 7 damages against each of the individual defendants in an amount sufficient to punish 8 and set an example of such individual defendants, to deter such conduct in the future, 9 and to set an example for others, in an amount to be determined by a jury; 10 11 F. Award plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt, and Seligman general damages in such 12 13 sums and nature as shall be determined by a jury; 14 Award plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt, and Seligman damages in such sums and 15

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- nature as shall be determined by a jury for physical, mental, and emotional injuries, pain, distress, suffering, anguish, fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shame, mortification, injured feelings, shock, humiliation and indignity, as well as other unpleasant physical, mental, and emotional reactions, damages to reputation, and other non-economic damages, in such sums and nature as shall be determined by a jury;
- H. Award plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt, and Seligman damages in such sums and nature as shall be determined by a jury for health care, services, supplies, medicines, health care appliances, modalities, and other related expenses in such sums and nature as shall be determined by a jury;

1	I. Award plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt, and Seligman damages in such sums
2	and nature as shall be determined by a jury for loss of wages, income, earnings,
3	earning capacity, support, services, benefits, and other past and future economic
4	damages in such sums and nature as shall be determined by a jury;
5	
6	J. Award plaintiffs Ipsen, Debbaudt, and Seligman damages for other
7	actual, consequential, and/or incidental damages in such sums and nature as shall be
8	determined by a jury;
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10	K. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, and other applicable law, award the Plaintiffs
11	their costs and expenses incurred in bringing this action, including reasonable
12	attorneys' fees;
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14	L. Award plaintiffs pre-judgment interest as available by law.
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16	M. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable and
17	proper.
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1 **REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL** 2 Plaintiffs request a jury trial for all issues so triable. 3 4 5 DATED: April 5, 2010 6 Respectfully submitted, 7 MATTHEW G. MONFORTON, 8 (SBN 175518) MONFORTON LAW OFFICES, PLLC 9 10 By: MATTHEW G. MONFORTON 11 Attorney for Plaintiffs Association 12 of Deputy District Attorneys and 13 Unnamed Deputy District Attorney 14 15 GREGORY W. SMITH (SBN 134385) 16 MARLA A. BROWN (SBN 140158) 17 LAW OFFICES OF GREGORY W. **SMITH** 18 19 By: Marla Brown 20 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Steven 21 J. Ipsen, Marc Debbaudt and Hyatt 22 Seligman 23 24 25 26 27 28